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ABSTRACT
Mayo v. Prometheus and Alice v. CLS are landmark Supreme Court
decisions which respectively introduced and then instituted a new, two-
step patent-eligibility test. Step One tests the patent claims for abstract-
ness, while Step Two tests for inventive application. This new test was
so demanding that in the one-year period after Alice was decided, over
80 percent of all challenged patents had one or more claims invali-
dated. In fact, at the Federal Circuit over the same time period, only
one recorded case of a successful Alice defense exists—DDR Holdings
v. Hotels.com.
This note explains DDR’s success as an inconsistency in the Fed-
eral Circuit’s application of Alice, and also as the first time that the
Federal Circuit placed greater emphasis on the claim steps “as an or-
dered combination” than individually under Alice Step Two. To resolve
this inconsistency with the Federal Circuit’s other decisions, a possible
resolution is proposed which takes into account the “unexpected ef-
fects” uniquely present in DDR’s ordered combination of steps. The
logical implication of DDR is that claims may be saved from invalida-
tion if the individual steps are unconventional, or if the steps as an
ordered combination produce “unexpected effects.” A four-box matrix
is presented to visually represent the realm of logical possibilities when
the conventionality of the individual steps is squared off against the
expectedness of the effects of the ordered combination of steps.
This note also briefly explores the 19th century historical under-
pinnings of the two-part abstractness and inventive concept test, and
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shows how the concept of abstractness evolved over a trilogy of Su-
preme Court cases in the 20th century. It brings to light and questions
the Mayo Court’s unreasoned decision to select—and the Alice Court’s
blind decision to endorse—Flook’s “inventive application” abstract-
ness standard, when before Mayo, there existed at least four distinct
patent-eligibility standards (arranged in ascending order of exi-
gency)—practical application (Le Roy v. Tatham); scope-limited prac-
tical application (Gottschalk v. Benson); process application (Diamond
v. Diehr); and inventive application (Parker v. Flook). The Court’s de-
cision is especially questionable because it was Diehr’s “process ap-
plication” standard that was latest-in-time, and because Diehr had
explicitly denounced Flook’s “inventive application” standard.
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INTRODUCTION
In Alice v. CLS,1 the Supreme Court established that the two-step in-
quiry articulated in Mayo v. Prometheus2 was not just a one-off inquiry spe-
cific to the facts of that case.3 Rather, it was “a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.”4 The
framework comprises two steps. First, it asks if the disputed claims were
1. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
2. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
3. Compare Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347, with Ass’n. of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (where the Court did not apply Mayo’s two-step test to assess
subject matter eligibility).
4. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (emphasis added).
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directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea.5 If so, the
second step asks if the claim’s elements contain an inventive concept suffi-
cient to transform the patent-ineligible idea into a patent-eligible application
of that idea.6
Alice, with its two-step framework, led to a massive wave of invalida-
tions at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and at the courts below.7
As of its first anniversary on June 19, 2015, Alice was applied to a total of
272 decisions and opinions—198 from the PTAB, 63 from United States
District Courts, and 11 from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.8
Out of the 345 patents that were challenged before these three tribunals, 286
had at least one claim invalidated, representing a shocking 82.9 percent in-
validation rate.9 Even more, within the same one-year timeframe, the Federal
Circuit (citing Alice) upheld just one patent while invalidating 15, for a
93.75 percent invalidation rate.10
Through a five-part discussion, this note attempts to explain the stun-
ning results at the Federal Circuit and, using the court’s reasoning and lan-
guage, distill the key characteristics of a patent that it would likely uphold as
patent-eligible. Because the only patent that the Federal Circuit has upheld
as patent-eligible in its decisions that cite Alice is a software patent, this
note’s scope of analysis is confined to the Federal Circuit’s seven preceden-
tial software-related patent decisions issued within one year of Alice.11
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) was statutorily created as part of the
America Invents Act. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012). It reviews, on appeal, adverse examiner decisions,
post-issuance challenges to patents, and interferences. Id. The timeline can be very short. For
example, petitions for Post-Grant Reviews – a procedure by which third parties may challenge
the (subject matter) validity of issued claims – must be filed no later than 9 months after the
patent’s issue/reissue date, and the Board’s final determination must be made within one year
of instituting review. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
8. Statutorily, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the only venue for dissat-
isfied parties to appeal the final written decisions of the PTAB in Post-Grant and Inter Partes
Reviews. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012).
9. Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 540.
10. Upheld: DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1256-58 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(one patent). Invalidated: WildTangent v. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 709, 714-15 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(one patent); Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (one patent); Planet Bingo v. VKGS, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1008-09 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(nonprecedential opinion) (two patents); buySAFE v. Google, 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (one patent); In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litiga-
tion, 774 F.3d 755, 764-65 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (three patents); Content Extraction & Transmis-
sion v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (four patents); AllVoice
Developments US, LLC, v. Microsoft, 612 F. App’x 1009, 1017-19 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (one
patent); OIP Techs. v. Amazon, 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (one patent); Ariosa
Diagnostics v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (one patent).
11. The discussion includes Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, 790 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2015), which was decided one year and five days after Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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Part I introduces the concept of abstract ideas, and explains how the
term was originally understood in the 19th century. Part II discusses juris-
prudence pre-Mayo and Alice. Part II-A explains how the abstract idea con-
cept changed in the 20th century, as the Supreme Court began to look
beyond the form of the patent’s claims and deeper into its substance. This
was when the Court began to introduce additional qualifications such as an
“inventive concept” to distinguish the non-abstract from the abstract. In Part
II-B, in a case about business method patents, the Court revisits subject mat-
ter eligibility for the first time in the 21st century after a three-decade hiatus.
Part III frames Mayo and Alice’s two-step subject matter eligibility test as an
unexplained choice the Court made between two unresolved patent-eligibil-
ity standards from the 1980s. Part IV examines the impact of Alice on
software patent-eligibility at the Federal Circuit, with particular emphasis on
a comparison of the recent opinions of DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com12 and
Ultramercial v. Hulu.13 DDR is important because it is the only software
patent case at the Federal Circuit to have survived a section 101 invalidity
challenge. Ultramercial, like DDR, also concerns a method of internet ad-
vertising, but while the court upheld the patents in DDR, it invalidated those
in Ultramercial. These two cases show how different analytical approaches
to similar facts lead to opposite results. Part V proposes a reconciliation of
DDR and Ultramercial by focusing on the “unexpected result” that was
found in DDR. For this purpose, I propose a taxonomy of four logically
possible combinations to categorize claims based on how courts have treated
them in Step Two of the Alice analysis. The combinations are expressed as a
four-box matrix to help practitioners and analysts quickly visualize the
strength of their patent portfolio against subject matter eligibility challenges.
I. WHAT IS AN ABSTRACT IDEA?
  Section 101 of the Patent Act offers a seemingly broad definition of pat-
ent-eligibility:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title.14
The Supreme Court has stated that this language should be broadly con-
strued, noting that Congress “intended statutory subject matter to ‘include
anything under the sun that is made by man.’”15 Yet, given such a broad
12. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
13. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979
(1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399). Patents
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construction, why is it that within the one year following Alice, the Federal
Circuit invalided over 90 percent of the patents brought before it for being
directed to ineligible subject matter? It appears that not everything under the
sun is patent-eligible.
Since at least 1852, the Court has laid down exceptions to the rule. In Le
Roy v. Tatham, the Court stated that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a funda-
mental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one
can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”16 The following year, in
O’Reilly v. Morse, the Court stated that “[t]he mere discovery of a new ele-
ment, or law, or principle of nature, without any valuable application of it to
the arts, is not the subject of a patent.”17  Three judicial exceptions were thus
created, and patents directed to laws of nature, physical phenomena, or ab-
stract ideas fell outside the statutorily permissible subject matter for patents
(i.e. process, machine, manufacture, and composition of matter). The ab-
stract idea exception caused the patents in Alice, and in all but one of the
software cases before the Federal Circuit in the past year, to be invalidated.
Just how broad is this abstract idea exception, and what exactly is an
abstract idea? Professor Kevin Collins has proposed four types of abstract
ideas:18 ideas on the workings and thoughts of the human mind;19 ideas that
are not sufficiently disclosed in the specifications;20 ideas that are divorced
from the material world;21 and ideas that are so broad as to be “insufficiently
directed to a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter collectively known as
statutory subject matter is said to be directed to subject matter that is patent-eligible.
16. 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
17. 56 U.S. 62, 132 (1854).
18. Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract
Idea”, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011).
19. Id. at 46-48. Professor Collins uses the phrase “embodiments” to distinguish the
physical implementation of an idea (an “embodiment” of that idea) from an idea as it exists in
the purely mental state. Id. at 46-48. He explains that a mousetrap inventor cannot obtain rights
to exclude others from performing the “idea-like mental processes” of building better mouse-
traps, but can obtain such rights for “roughly the set of things or methods that embody the
knowledge . . . conveyed by a patent specification.” Id. at 47. Thought of in terms of infringe-
ment, the individual mousetraps that infringe a mousetrap claim are the physical manifesta-
tions or embodiments of the inventor’s idea. Id.
20. Id. at 50-53 (discussing O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112, in which Morse claimed the use of
electro-magnetism to print characters “at any distances,” without limit to “the specific machin-
ery . . . described in the foregoing specification and claims.”). Contrary to Professor Collins’
framing of the claim deficiency as being one of an impermissible claim of a principle (electro-
magnetism), the O’Reilly Court explicitly stated that it was invalidating the claim because it
was “too broad.” Specifically, the Court found that Morse had claimed “an exclusive right to
use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and there-
fore could not describe when he obtained his patent.” In today’s parlance then, the problem
with Morse’s claim (as framed by the Court), was one of enablement, not of abstractness.
21. Id. at 55; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that
business method patents were abstract because they could be “performed without using suffi-
ciently physical, machine-like technology and without causing sufficient change to the mate-
rial world.”).
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applied.”22 Professor Collins’ final classification is of particular relevance
since it most resonates with Alice, where the Court held that “generic com-
puter implementation” was not enough to transform a claim over a “funda-
mental economic practice” into a patent-eligible application of that idea.23
As with any formal definition, line drawing quickly becomes a central
concern. How much “application” must be added to a natural law—like
E=MC2, the heat of the sun, or the law of gravity—to transform the claimed
use of the natural law from a patent-ineligible (abstract) idea into patent-
eligible subject matter? Professor Collins relies on the Supreme Court’s “fa-
mous trilogy on the patent eligibility of computer software”—Gottschalk v.
Benson,24 Parker v. Flook,25 and Diamond v. Diehr26—to delineate where
the Court draws that line. He ultimately concludes that “[b]etween the two
data points provided by Flook and Diehr . . . there is a vast unknown, and
hence, unresolved problem of vagueness.”27 Before examining in detail the
patent claims presented by the individual cases of this famous trilogy, it is
worthwhile to gain context by taking a whirlwind tour through the old case
of Le Roy v. Tatham (1853), where the Supreme Court first elaborated on the
notion that ideas were not patentable.
In Le Roy, the Hanson brothers discovered that lead pipe could be pro-
duced by contact welding (i.e., by mechanically pressing the hot component
parts together under heat and pressure). There, the Court found that what
was claimed was not the principle of contact welding, but an application of
contact welding to form lead pipe. The Court stated that the scientific princi-
ple of contact welding was not patentable, but the “processes used to extract,
modify, and concentrate natural agencies” were.28 In fact, as revealed by
Justice Nelson in his dissenting opinion, this patentability exception dates
back even further than Le Roy, to the 1795 English case of Boulton v. Bull.29
There, Lord Chief Justice Eyre opined that:
[T]here can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a principle so
far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a
condition to act and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or
manual occupation, I think there may be a patent.30
22. Id. at 58-61 (discussing the binary conversion algorithm in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972) as a type of claim that describes “things/methods that were actually in-
vented but that are abstract because they have too many end-uses and are thus insufficiently
applied to merit patent protection.”).
23. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.
24. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
25. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
26. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
27. Collins, supra note 18, at 60.
28. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
29. Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463 (1795).
30. Boulton, 2 H. Bl. at 495 (Eyre C.J.). The quote continues: “It is not that the patentee
has conceived an abstract notion, that the consumption of steam in fire engines may be less-
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  Thus, the dichotomy, at least as it existed in 1853,31 was between abstract
ideas which lacked practical application (such as an idea of itself, original
causes, and motives) and ideas which had (such as those applied to industrial
processes or in the “commerce or manufacture” of a new device).32 Rubber-
Tip sums up the rule as follows: “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, but a
new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”33
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE MAYO AND ALICE
A. Abstract Idea or Process: The Benson, Flook, and Diehr Trilogy
  The fight between patent-ineligible abstract ideas and patent-eligible
processes is played out in the Benson-Flook-Diehr trilogy. In Benson, the
patent claimed an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals
into pure binary form. The Supreme Court held that the claim was “so ab-
stract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [al-
gorithm].”34 Furthermore, the Court found that “[t]he end use may . . . vary
from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to research-
ing the law books for precedents,”35 and so was “in practical effect . . . a
patent of the algorithm itself.”36 Six years later, in Flook, the Court inter-
preted Benson as standing for the “long-established principle [that] ‘phe-
nomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scien-
tific and technological work.’”37 Thus, the Court reasoned that under Ben-
son’s principle, a claim would be abstract if it covered the entire universe of
possible uses or the basic tools of science.
ened, but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it . . . . Surely this is a very different
thing from taking a patent for a principle; it is not for a principle, but for a process.” Id. at
495–96.
31. At the time of Boulton in 1795, the English courts were conflicted over whether a
method which did not result in any new manufacture was patentable. Unlike in the U.S., where
the dichotomy was principle/process, the dichotomy that existed in England was principle/
manufacture. See Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1297-98
(2012). The dichotomy that existed for them was of “unpatentable principles” or “patentable
manufactures.” Id. at 1299.
32. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175. While it may not be entirely clear if Le Roy’s list of ex-
cluded subject matter includes mental processes, it is clear that Le Roy focused on practical
applications of ideas—the Court stated that “[a] new property discovered in matter, when
practically applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture, is
patentable.” Id. at 175. See also Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
33. Rubber-Tip, 87 U.S. at 507. Interestingly, although Rubber Tip has been cited in
Benson, Flook, and Diehr for the proposition that “an idea of itself is not patentable,” Rubber
Tip really was a case about novelty, or the lack thereof in the claimed idea of attaching rubber
eraser tips to pencils. Id. at 498.
34. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
35. Id. at 68.
36. Id. at 72.
37. Flook, 437 U.S. at 599 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67).
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In Flook, the claims set forth a method of using a mathematical al-
gorithm to automatically update alarm limits in a catalytic conversion pro-
cess. Even though the Court agreed that the claims did not “wholly preempt
the mathematical formula,” the Court still held that the claimed method was
not directed to a process, but was instead an attempt to claim a mathematical
formula.38 The Court reasoned that the step of automatically updating the
alarm limits based on the output of the algorithm was “post-solution activ-
ity,” and could not be the defining criterion between a patent-ineligible prin-
ciple and a patent-eligible process. Such a criterion would “exalt[ ] form
over substance,” because any competent draftsman could attach some form
of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula.39
Instead, according to the Flook Court, the defining criterion was inven-
tive application. This came as a result of its reading of Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.40 and Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo,41 which the Court
cited for the proposition that “the process itself . . . must be new and use-
ful.”42 This led the Court to hold that for a claim to be patent-eligible, it must
contain an “inventive application” of a principle, because the mere discovery
of a principle was not enough.43  In effect, requiring inventive application
was really just the Court’s euphemism for requiring novelty. This is revealed
by the Court’s search for an inventive application, where it dissected the
claims into their individual components and found that each component—
from the catalytic conversion process to the practice of monitoring process
variables to the use of computers for automatic alarm monitoring—was
“well-known” and therefore lacked inventive application.44 Analytically
then, Flook’s inventive application standard is more demanding than Le
Roy’s practical application standard.
38. Id. at 590. Flook only claimed the algorithm in the context of alarm limits, and only
then for the purpose of updating alarm limits tagged to process variables of a specific pro-
cess—the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 591 (“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scien-
tific truth may be.”) (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939).
41. Id. (“He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it
must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”) (quoting Funk
Bros. Seed v. Kalo, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. (holding that “[I]t is absolutely clear that respondent’s application contains no
claim of patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hy-
drocarbons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables,
the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed
and readjusted, and the use of computers for ‘automatic monitoring-alarming.’ ”).
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The third case, Diehr, takes a radical departure from Flook. In Diehr,
the Court upheld the patent eligibility of a computer-implemented rubber
curing process that used the well-known Arrhenius equation to continuously
calculate remaining cure time. Without overruling Flook, Diehr explicitly
denounced Flook’s dissection of the claims as “inappropriate,” and debased
Flook’s inventive application standard by stating that the novelty “of any
steps in a process, or even of the process itself” was not relevant in a subject
matter inquiry.45 Instead, Diehr applied a “whole claims” approach, where
the central criterion was whether the claimed process, as a whole, was “per-
forming a function which the patent laws were designed to protect.”46
The Diehr Court first noted that the rubber curing process was an indus-
trial process that has “historically [been] eligible to receive the protection of
our patent laws.” While the Court had evidently taken history into considera-
tion, the only formal example that it provided of such a patent-protected
function was the “transformation or reduction of an article to a different state
or thing.”47 However, the Court clarified that achieving such a transforma-
tion or reduction was not sufficient on its own, but was only a “clue” toward
determining patent eligibility.48
In Diehr, the fact that the claim provided a step-by-step description of
the rubber curing process and that the process itself produced “a result here-
tofore unknown in the art” gave the Court sufficient grounds to find the
claims were directed to a process rather than a mathematical principle.49 This
may seem overly formalistic, because a competent draftsman could cloak a
mathematical principle or an abstract idea in step-by-step process language
replete with tangible inputs and outputs—but that was the price the Diehr
Court was willing to pay to keep Flook’s novelty analysis at bay.
By the close of the trilogy, three vastly different patent eligibility stan-
dards had arisen. Under Benson, an idea was found patent-ineligible (ab-
stract) if its practical implementation would cover all known and unknown
uses of the idea. Under Flook, an idea was found abstract if the individual
45. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89 (“It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and
new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis [as was done
in Flook]. This is particularly true in a process claim, because a new combination of steps in a
process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well
known and in common use before the combination was made. The ‘novelty’ of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject mat-
ter.”) (emphasis added).
46. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 (“On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathe-
matical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies
the requirements of § 101.”) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 184.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 184, n.14.
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steps of the process were not novel. Under Diehr, the question was whether
or not the process performed some patent-protected function. Arranged on
an ascending scale, Le Roy would be prototypical of the most forgiving stan-
dard (requiring practical application); followed by Benson (claims can’t be
sweeping); then Diehr (requiring process application); and finally Flook (re-
quiring inventive application).
B. Bilski and the Patent Eligibility of Intangible Process Claims
  Almost three decades passed before the Supreme Court had the chance to
decide another patent case—Bilski v. Kappos.50 Bilski is important because it
left the door open for patent protection of not only business method claims,
but also other intangible subject-matter claims (such as software claims). It
also showed how the current Supreme Court applied the Benson-Flook-
Diehr trilogy.
In Bilski, the patent at issue claimed a method of hedging against the
risk of price changes in commodities trading and a mathematical formula
expressing the same. Since the claim was directed to a completely intangible
process, an important patentability threshold question existed: whether or
not business method claims, which were not tied to a particular machine, and
which did not transform or reduce an article to a different state or thing (the
“machine-or-transformation” test),51 were patent-ineligible for that reason
alone.
The Court first held that the machine-or-transformation test was only a
“useful and important clue,” and not “the sole test” for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible process.52 Thus, a claim could still be directed
to a process even if it were not tied to a machine, and did not transform or
reduce an article to a different state or thing. The Court pointed out that the
broad definition of “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)53 did not limit patent-
eligible processes to only those which passed the machine-or-transformation
test.54 Relying on the rule of statutory interpretation that each term should be
defined by its “ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning,” the Court
defined “method” as “[a]n orderly procedure or process . . . regular way or
50. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
51. The “machine-or-transformation” test was first articulated in Benson, where “[i]t
[wa]s argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or
must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ ” 409 U.S. at 71. In
Benson, the Court did not affirmatively reject the machine-or-transformation test, but only
stated in the negative that “[w]e do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did
not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.” Id.
52. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604.
53. The term “process” means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
54. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603.
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manner of doing anything . . . a set form of procedure adopted in investiga-
tion or instruction.”55
Under this broad definition of “process,” only five justices found that
business method patents were not categorically excluded from patent protec-
tion.56 The Court was unanimous, however, in voting to retain the judicial
exclusions for abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. Thus,
the next question was whether the particular claims in Bilski were directed to
a patent-eligible method or a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
The Bilski Court held that the claims were abstract and cited to Benson,
Flook, and Diehr. While the Court’s fluid citation to the trilogy may seem
like it was applying all three standards at once, its analysis was focused not
on whether the claims described a process, but on whether the claims were
abstract. Analogizing to Benson, the Court held that allowing the claims in
Bilski would preempt the use of hedging in all fields and grant the inventors
a monopoly over “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce.”57 Neither Flook’s inventive application standard, nor
Diehr’s patent-protected function standard, were explicitly used to reject the
claims. Instead, the Court cited Flook for the proposition that limiting an
algorithm to a particular technological environment would not render an ab-
stract idea patent-eligible.58 Similarly, it cited Diehr for its emphasis on ana-
lyzing claims as a whole, and for the idea that an application of a
mathematical formula could be patent-eligible if the claim as a whole was
not “an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather an industrial
process for the molding of rubber products.”59
Thus, Bilski left open the question of whether it was the Flook or Diehr
standard (and the question of how each case should be applied) that should
determine if an idea was directed to a patent-eligible process.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 657. Bilski was a 5-4 decision on the issue of patentability of business meth-
ods. Justice Stevens concurrence was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
57. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610. In Bilski, what was claimed was essentially the following
steps: i) sell a commodity at fixed price A (assume A is the short position price); ii) identify
other traders willing to take a counter-position (i.e., long); iii) sell commodity at fixed price Z
to those other traders to offset the earlier (short) position. Id. at 599. There is no practical
difference between Bilski’s claimed method of protecting against financial risk by matching up
traders looking to take on opposite positions and the concept of hedging, which is the idea of
taking opposing short and long investment positions to balance financial risk.
58. Id. at 610.
59. Id. at 611.
298 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:287
III. THE TWO-STEP FRAMEWORK FOR PATENT SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY
A. Mayo and the Beginning of the Two-Step Framework
  A year later the Supreme Court answered the question left open by Bilski,
albeit in an unexpected way. Instead of simply deciding which standard ap-
plied, the Court combined Benson’s abstract idea inquiry with Flook’s in-
ventive application inquiry in a two-step analysis.60 Step One asked if the
claims were directed to a natural law.61 Step Two asked whether the claims
do “significantly more” than describe the natural law, i.e., whether they con-
tained an “inventive concept.”62
In Mayo, the claim at issue involved a method of optimizing thiopurine
drug treatment.63 A thiopurine drug was first administered to a patient, with
blood samples subsequently taken to measure the amount of drug that had
been metabolized by the body. If the metabolite levels dipped below a
threshold specified in the claim, that would indicate that the dosage should
be increased to achieve efficacy; conversely, if the levels exceeded a higher
specified threshold, the dosage should be decreased to avoid toxic side
effects.
In Step One, the Court held that the claimed relationship between me-
tabolite levels and drug dosage “itself exists in principle apart from any
human action,” and “[t]he relation is a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body – [an] entirely natural
process[ ].” Thus, the Court found that the claims set forth natural laws.64
In Step Two, the Court dissected the claim in search of an “inventive
concept,” and held that the claim did not add enough to transform the “state-
ments of . . . correlations” into a process that “appl[ies] natural laws.”65 The
claim contained three steps—an “administering” step, a “wherein” step, and
a “determining” step.66 According to the Court, doctors had been administer-
ing drugs containing 6-thioguanine long before the patent issued; the instruc-
tion to increase or decrease dosage merely informed a doctor of the relevant
natural laws; and methods for determining the metabolite levels were al-
ready well known in the art.67 Each of the three steps individually consisted
of “well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the
scientific community,” and the claim as a whole added “nothing significant
beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.”68 The result was that either
60. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1289.
64. Id. at 1297.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1297-98.
68. Id.
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individually or as a whole, the steps were insufficient to transform “unpat-
entable natural correlations into patentable applications.”69
In effect, Mayo’s Step Two analysis is nothing more than a rehash of
Flook’s inventive application analysis—it even uses some of the same lan-
guage. In Flook, the Court framed the question before it as whether “the
formula . . . the only novel feature of respondent’s method . . . makes an
otherwise conventional method eligible for patent protection.”70 While the
question before the Mayo Court was not framed in exactly the same way,71
the Mayo Court—like the Flook Court before it—also dissected the claim
into its individual steps, and found that there was no patentable invention
because everything about the method was “well known” and “conven-
tional.”72 In short, the Mayo Court followed Flook’s analytical approach to a
tee.
But why should Flook have been the standard to apply at Step Two, and
not Diehr, when it was the more recent case? The Mayo Court did not ade-
quately explain why process qua process was not enough. It referenced the
“draftsman’s art,”73 but this was the same concern that the Diehr Court con-
sidered when it decided against applying Flook’s inventive application stan-
dard.74 Moreover, in light of Diehr’s two admonitions against the dissecting
of claims and the tainting of subject matter eligibility with novelty, why did
stare decisis not apply?
The simple answer is that the Court was either confused, or was attempt-
ing to heroically reinterpret Diehr’s clear rejection of the inventive applica-
tion standard. It explained that the process in Diehr was patent-eligible
because the “additional steps . . . integrated the equation into the process as a
whole . . . [and] transformed the process into an inventive application of the
formula.”75 However, this is an underwhelming gloss on Diehr that is both
factually and analytically inaccurate. Factually, the “additional steps” in
Diehr comprised the usual steps in the rubber curing process (the loading of
the mold, the opening of the press, etc.).76 By Mayo’s own standards, there is
nothing remotely inventive about these steps or the underlying rubber curing
69. Id. at 1298.
70. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added).
71. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (stating that “The question before us is whether the claims
do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more
precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the
processes they describe to qualify as patent eligible processes that apply natural laws?”).
72. Compare Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297-98 with Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
73. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
74. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 (“To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman
to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent
protection.”).
75. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1292 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
76. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
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process itself—Diehr claimed the same rubber curing process that had been
known for over a century.77 Analytically, the Diehr Court believed it was
“inappropriate” to dissect the claims into individual steps in the first place;
and even if the Court had dissected the claims in that case, the additional
steps did not transform a patent-ineligible mathematical principle into a pat-
ent-eligible inventive application of that principle; rather, they transformed a
patent-ineligible mathematical principle into a patent-eligible process of cur-
ing synthetic rubber.78 Under the latter analysis, novelty and inventiveness
were irrelevant.79
B. Alice Applies Mayo’s Two-Step Framework
  Instead of bringing to light the latent issues in the Mayo Court’s decision
to apply Flook over Diehr, the Alice Court endorsed Mayo’s two-step test as
“a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applica-
tions of those concepts.”80 Alice demonstrated that the Mayo framework was
capable of transcending its biopharmaceutical and law-of-nature roots, and
transplanting itself into the realm of abstract ideas and computer-executed
business methods. In Alice, the Court articulated the framework as follows:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else
is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, we con-
77. Id. at n.8.
78. See id. at 187 (“The respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process
admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the
use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These include installing rubber
in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly
recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer,
and automatically opening the press at the proper time. Obviously, one does not need a ‘com-
puter’ to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process
patent significantly lessens the possibility of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring,’ the process as a
whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter.”).
79. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at n.15 (“The fact that one or more of the steps in respondents’
process may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is irrele-
vant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for patent
protection under § 101.”).
80. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (emphasis added). That Mayo’s two-step test became the
gold standard is a little surprising, because the Court decided Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics in between Mayo and Alice, and there it did not apply Mayo’s two-step test.
569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). See also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prome-
theus: A Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 647, 654 (2015)
(opining “the [Myriad] Court’s holding, that isolated and purified human genetic sequences
were not patent-eligible, seemed premised only on § 101’s requirement that an invention be
‘new.’ However, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Court confirmed that Mayo’s framework is
the general test for patent eligibility.”).
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sider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an or-
dered combination” to determine whether the additional elements
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible applica-
tion. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
“‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements
that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself.”81
  The patent in Alice claimed “a method of exchanging financial obligations
between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement
risk.”82 Under Step One, the Court held that the method recited an abstract
idea because settlement through intermediaries was a “fundamental eco-
nomic practice” and a “building block of the modern economy.”83 Applying
the Flook inventive application standard under Step Two, the Alice Court
held that the sole “additional element”—the claim limitation that required
implementation by a generic computer—was not enough to transform the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.84
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first looked at the claim elements
separately, and held that the function performed by the computer at each step
was “purely conventional.”85 Next, considering the claim “as an ordered
combination,” the Court held that the computer components “ad[d] nothing
. . . that is not already present when the steps are considered separately,” and
determined that “[v]iewed as a whole, these method claims simply recite the
concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.”86
While the Court did not explicitly define what additional claim elements
would make the claim patent-eligible, it quoted Mayo’s proposition that
“‘[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of gener-
ality,’ to a method already ‘well known in the art’ was not ‘enough’ to sup-
ply the ‘inventive concept’ needed to make this transformation.”87
Specifically applied to software, “[a]n instruction to apply the abstract idea
of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer . . . is
not ‘enough’ to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”88
81. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-98 (2012) (internal
citations omitted).
82. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.
83. Id. at 2357.
84. Id. at 2358.
85. Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289).
88. Id. at 2360 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289). See also id. at 2358 (“Wholly ge-
neric computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides
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The Court did however provide some examples of the “additional fea-
tures” that might supply enough of an inventive concept to “transform the
abstract idea” into a patent-eligible application; these include “im-
prove[ments] [to] the functioning of the computer itself” or “improvement[s]
in any other technology or technical field.”89 Without further guidance, it is
impossible to tell the scale of improvement necessary to make the transfor-
mation, and it is likely that the patent-eligibility of many future software
patents will turn on this new doctrine. Patent drafters today should take the
Court’s cue to include more language in the claim specifications to show
how the claimed invention is an improvement over the prior art.
The aftermath of the Mayo Court’s decision to sweep Diehr under the
rug, and the Alice Court’s decision to endorse Mayo, was the tsunami of
invalidations at the lower courts. Part IV analyzes the Federal Circuit’s re-
cent crop of software decisions in order to explain why only one case has
successfully run the gauntlet of the Alice two-step.
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPLIES ALICE
  Within the first year or so after Alice, the Federal Circuit decided seven
precedential software patent cases on substantive grounds. In all but one
case, the Federal Circuit ruled that the patent claims were impermissibly
drawn to an abstract idea and lacked a transformative inventive concept.
In two cases, buySAFE v. Google90 and OIP Techs. v. Amazon.com,91 the
Federal Circuit directly applied Alice to hold that claims covering a transac-
tion guaranty (buySAFE) and an offer-based price optimization (OIP Techs.)
were abstract because they were directed to fundamental economic concepts.
At Step Two, the claims in both cases were held to be insufficiently applied
because they were implemented using generic computers. This was true de-
spite the fact that in OIP Techs., the invention arguably improved the func-
tioning of the computer. There, the use of computers and the internet
provided data which allowed price-optimization “with more granularity.”92
However, the court was not convinced. It cited Alice for the proposition that
the “use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transac-
any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.’ ”) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289).
89. Id. at 2359.
90. 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a transaction guaranty – a “long-famil-
iar” commercial practice of “ancient lineage” – was abstract, and that the mere addition of a
generic computer does not add an inventive concept).
91. 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that automated offer-based price optimiza-
tion is an abstract idea “similar to other ‘fundamental economic concepts’ ”; that the use of a
computer to automatically determine an optimized price is “routine” and “conventional”; and
that non-specific programming, i.e., “any sequence of instructions designed for execution on a
computer system” is overly broad to function as a limitation on pre-emption).
92. OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363.
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tions, and issue simultaneous instructions” was not inventive.93 Following
this proposition, the federal circuit held that a computer program allowing
users to perform tasks “more quickly or more accurately” was not
patentable.94
The remaining five Federal Circuit software cases do not deal with fun-
damental economic concepts. Three involve the manipulation of tangible
and intangible data, and two involve internet advertising.
A. Data Manipulation Cases
In Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. for Imaging, the patents at issue
claimed a device profile and a method to more accurately translate color
representations between input and output devices (e.g., between a camera
and a monitor) in a digital image processing system.95 The Federal Circuit
held that data manipulation—by transforming its spatial and color properties
from a device-dependent to a device-independent state—is “not directed to
any tangible embodiment of this information (i.e., in physical memory or
other medium)”; nor does it “claim any tangible part of the digital process-
ing system.”96 Therefore, the court held that this claim fell outside the eligi-
ble subject matter categories.97 To better understand the court’s holding, it is
helpful to think in the non-technology analog of purely mental processes.
Just as human thought is patent-ineligible because it is merely a collection of
ideas without any tangible embodiment, “[d]ata in its ethereal, nonphysical
form is simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of
eligible subject matter under section 101.”98
Digitech therefore seems to imply that tangible embodiments of data
would be patent-eligible. However, in Content Extraction and Trans. v.
Wells Fargo Bank (“CET”), the Federal Circuit held otherwise.99 In CET, the
steps comprised collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected
data set, and storing that recognized data in memory. Even though the final
storage step made the data tangible, the claims were still found to be ab-
stract, because they were “drawn to the basic concept of data recognition and
storage . . . [which] humans have always performed.”100 CET argued that the
claims should not be held abstract because computers were required to pro-
cess and recognize the stream of bits output by a scanner, but the court
93. Id. at 1363 (quoting Alice, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
94. Id.
95. 758 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing the patent claims).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added).
99. 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
100. Id. at 1347; the Federal Circuit goes on to say that, “[a]nd banks have, for some
time, reviewed checks, recognized relevant data such as the amount, account number, and
identity of account holder, and stored that information in their records.” Id.
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pointed out that in Alice, computers were likewise required to process the
stream of bits output by the computers performing the financial transactions,
and that did not save the claims from being held abstract.101 The Court anal-
ogized to Alice, and reasoned that just as claims directed to “the concept of
intermediated settlement” were abstract, so too must claims “drawn to the
basic concept of data recognition and storage” be abstract.102
While it might seem that the Federal Circuit created a new “fundamental
IT concepts” subcategory of abstract ideas, another way to understand the
case is to de-emphasize the “fundamental-ness” of the idea, and instead fo-
cus on the comparison between the idea and the scope of its implementation
in the claimed method. Recall that Benson held that a claim would be ab-
stract if it were so sweeping as to cover both “known and unknown” uses of
the idea.103 In CET, the method contained three steps: (1) receiving and stor-
ing scanner output into a memory; (2) recognizing hardcopy data corre-
sponding to a data field; and (3) storing that information into memory for
that corresponding data field. These steps are not only a literal transposition
of the idea of data storage and recognition into patent drafting jargon, but
they also apply to a sweeping range of activities (including the digitization
of everything from bank checks to medical images to sheet music). Thus, the
claims could be held abstract under Benson, without having to resort to the
fundamental economic concepts prong of the analysis.
In Step Two, the court could not find any additional limitations which
transformed the claims into a patent-eligible application. It held that the digi-
tization of hard copy information into computer-readable data using existing
technologies such as scanners, digitizers, optical recognition technology and
memory storage was a well-known “basic concept” that neither added an
inventive concept nor resulted in much more than a limitation to a “particu-
lar technological environment . . . [which] has been held insufficient to save
a claim in this context.”104
In Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network (“IPC”), the court held that
the claimed method of maintaining the state of online application forms on a
web browser, despite the (inadvertent) activation of other application forms
or the use of the back and forward buttons, was “directed to the idea itself—
the abstract idea of avoiding loss of data.”105 Specifically, the court held that
the step of maintaining a webform’s state described the “effect or result” and
was “dissociated from any method.”106 The court elaborated that the “mecha-
nism for maintaining state is not described, although this [was] stated to be
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
104. CET, 776 F.3d at 1348.
105. 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
106. Id.
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the essential invention.”107 While this may sound like the court is hinting at
an enablement problem, it could also be understood in terms of abstract-
ness—disclosure of the specific mechanism might have persuaded the court
that the claimed method was a specific and inventive implementation of the
idea of avoiding loss of data, rather than an attempt to claim the idea itself.
In Step Two, the Federal Circuit found that the additional elements of
the back and forward buttons were conventional, and the limitations of a
computer system, computer instructions, and computer-readable storage me-
dium were “merely generic data collection steps” attempting to “sit[e] the
ineligible concept in a particular technological environment.”108 This reflects
a direct application of Alice, which held that generic computer implementa-
tion was not enough to transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a pat-
ent-eligible claim.
At first glance, the data manipulation cases seem to suggest that the
Federal Circuit has greatly expanded the abstract idea category. The Federal
Circuit declared that intangible data was abstract in Digitech, recognized
“fundamental IT concepts” in CET, and even seemed to import elements of
enablement in IPC. However, these moves can also be understood under the
classical conception of abstract ideas. Overall, these cases are consistent
with Alice.
B. Internet Advertising Cases: DDR and Ultramercial
DDR has been the only software patent case to survive a patent eligibility
challenge at the Federal Circuit.109 This section explains what makes DDR
unique and compares DDR to Ultramercial, which, like DDR, also claimed a
method of internet advertising. The comparison reveals that both cases could
have gone the other way, and the different outcomes can be explained in
terms of the court’s different analytical standards, which harkens back to
Flook and Diehr.
In DDR, the patentee claimed a method of retaining website visitors by
imitating the “look and feel” of a host website.110 Without deciding what the
abstract idea was, the court held that the claims were patent-eligible under
Alice Step Two. The court cited a litany of reasons to justify its conclusion,
including that the claimed idea was “necessarily rooted in computer technol-
ogy”;111 that it “overc[a]me a problem specifically arising in the realm of
computer networks”;112 that it “overr[ode] the routine and conventional se-
quence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink”;113 and that
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1349.
109. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at 1245.
111. Id. at 1257.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1258.
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it solved the problem of being “instantly transported away” from a host’s
website when a hyperlink is activated.114 Concluding, the court wrote, “the
claimed solution amounts to an inventive concept for resolving this particu-
lar Internet-centric problem, rendering the claims patent-eligible.”115
The court in Ultramerial, on the other hand, held that the claimed
method of providing free access to online media in exchange for watching
an advertisement was not patentable. There, the court did begin by identify-
ing the abstract idea—namely “using advertisement as an exchange or cur-
rency.” The court then proceeded to Alice Step Two, and held that the
additional steps to unblock access to the media were “routine,” “conven-
tional,” or comprised of “insignificant ‘[pre]-solution activity’ ” that cannot
transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.116 For example,
the step to consult and update an activity log to determine that the advertise-
ment was not played more times than contracted for was held to be an “in-
significant ‘data-gathering step[ ],’”117 and the step to require a user’s active
consent before the advertisement is played was regarded as “insignificant
‘[pre]-solution activity.’”118 The court also held that adding the internet as a
claim limitation gave no “practical assurance that the process is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”119
Having set forth both cases, this note will attempt to show that if Ul-
tramercial had been analyzed under DDR’s rubric, the opposite result would
have been reached, and vice versa.
The analysis begins by defining the problem that Ultramercial was at-
tempting to resolve. The specifications of the Ultramercial patent set forth
two problems.120 First, intellectual property owners were not getting paid the
royalties owed to them because “the widespread use of the Internet has made
it possible to distribute and share intellectual property in its digital form,
worldwide, beyond the control of the intellectual property rights holders.”121
Second, “Internet banner ads have hit new lows in responses. Once a 3%
click-through rate, they are now, at the time of filing this application, as low
as 2 click-throughs per 1,000 impressions.”122 Both of these problems are
114. Id. at 1257-59.
115. Id. at 1259.
116. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; Mayo, 132 S.
Ct. at 1298).
117. Id. (quoting CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2011)).
118. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
119. Id. at 716 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370
(2011) (reasoning that the use of the Internet to verify credit card transaction does not mean-
ingfully add to the abstract idea of verifying the transaction)).
120. U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (‘545 Patent) (filed May 29, 2001).
121. ‘545 Patent, supra note 120, at col. 1, l. 32-36.
122. Id. at col. 2, ll. 14-19.
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“Internet-centric,” and they “specifically aris[e] in the realm of computer
networks.”123
Ultramercial’s invention solved both problems by putting together in-
ternet advertisers with intellectual property owners offering their media for
sale online. For every time that a media product was accessed, the advertiser
would automatically pay the intellectual property owner a royalty. In return,
advertisers would be guaranteed a captive audience, because consumers
were prevented from accessing the copyrighted media unless they had first
consented to view an advertisement. Such a seamless system guaranteed
worldwide payment and advertising that could only be done using computers
and the internet. Therefore the invention was “necessarily rooted in com-
puter technology.”
Finally, the claimed invention had also overridden “the routine and con-
ventional sequence of events.”124 At the time, unauthorized access to copy-
righted media had become a widespread problem thanks to the internet, and
click-throughs for conventional online advertising had plummeted ten-
fold.125 Additionally, the specifications described the rise of Napster, which,
because it was free, became a “very attractive site to illegally download
copyrighted music.”126 The specifications also explained how the obvious
solution—charging fees—would be ineffective, because those “under 18
years of age, who [could not] purchase easily online . . . would continue to
seek other means by which to illegally download music.”127 Charging fees
would also do nothing to prevent college students from using their school-
supplied high-speed Internet connections to “massive[ly] download[ ] . . .
un-paid for copyrighted music.”128 By offering a non-fee solution to the
problem, the claimed invention sought to break the routine and convention
of free, illegal distribution of copyrighted works, while simultaneously en-
suring that intellectual property owners received royalties and advertisers
were guaranteed viewership.
A sharp reader may point out that the preceding paragraphs attempt to
show that the invention was not “routine and conventional” by comparing it
with the state of the art at the time (in the same vein as a “whole claims”
approach),129 an approach which seems curious given the well-established
divide-and-conquer method of individual step analysis. For example, in
Mayo, the steps of administering a drug, measuring the metabolite, and ad-
justing the drug’s dosage were “well understood, routine, conventional activ-
123. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257, 1259.
124. Id. at 1257.
125. See ‘545 Patent, supra note 120, at col. 1, l. 32-36, col. 2, ll. 14-19.
126. Id. at col. 1, l. 59-63.
127. Id.
128. Id. at col. 1, ll. 64-67.
129. See supra p. 109-10 discussion of Diehr’s “whole claims” approach.
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ity already engaged in by the scientific community.”130 However, the
following second round analysis, in which Ultramercial’s rationale is ap-
plied to DDR, will show that the Federal Circuit is not so hamstrung that it
cannot consider claims holistically.
In Ultramercial, the court had properly followed the Alice two-step by
first defining an abstract idea in Step One before proceeding to Step Two.
By contrast, in DDR, the parties could not even pinpoint the abstract idea.
Instead of deciding on one definition, the court let it slide. In its opinion,
under any of the appellant’s various characterizations of the abstract idea,131
and even by the dissent’s characterization of the same,132 the claims would
still have satisfied Step Two.133 But defining an abstract idea at Step One is a
crucial step that cannot be skipped. Whether to take a high or low level of
abstraction is an important question of law, because it determines the addi-
tional steps to be analyzed under Step Two. In this regard, Supreme Court
precedent—particularly Bilski and Alice—dictates that a high level of ab-
straction should be taken. While a broad approach means that an idea is
more likely to be found abstract, it also leaves more room to find an inven-
tive step under Step Two.134 This is because when compared to a highly-
abstracted idea, it becomes easier to frame each step as a specific implemen-
tation of the idea, rather than an attempt to claim all “known and unknown”
uses of that idea.135
Returning to the analysis, DDR claimed an outsourcing system which,
upon activation of a commercial link on the source page by the user, serves
up composite webpages which look and feel like the host webpage by com-
bining stored visual elements of the host webpage with commerce object
content from the advertiser link.136 The invention thereby sought to create a
130. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
131. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (citing examples of the appellants’ various characterizations
of the abstract idea, “including ‘making two web pages look the same,’ ‘syndicated commerce
on the computer using the Internet,’ and ‘making two e-commerce web pages look alike by
using licensed trademarks, logos, color schemes and layouts.’ ”).
132. Id. (quoting the dissent’s characterization of the abstract idea as “the entrepreneurial
goal ‘that an online merchant’s sales can be increased if two webpages have the same ‘look
and feel.’ ”).
133. Id. at 1259 (holding that because the claims “recite[d] a specific way to automate
the creation of a composite web page by an ‘outsource provider’ that incorporate[d] elements
from multiple sources in order to solve a problem faced by websites on the Internet,” the
claims include[d] “ ‘additional features’ that ensure[d] the claims [we]re ‘more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]’ ”).
134. Within limits, the broader the idea allegedly claimed by the patent, the easier it is
for the claims to be held abstract, because the claims would come closer to the “basic tools” of
innovation. See Alice, 132 S. Ct. at 2354. The corollary is that at extreme levels of abstraction,
the claim steps would easily be regarded as practical implementations of such highly-ab-
stracted ideas in Alice Step Two.
135. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
136. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1248.
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third-party ad webpage that was stylistically indistinguishable from the link-
ing (host) webpage.
A broad construction of the abstract idea would be making two
webpages look the same.137 Under this construction, the “outsource pro-
vider”—an external web server which automatically generates composite
webpages that look and feel like the source page—could be an additional
element of sufficient inventiveness to transform the abstract idea into a pat-
ent-eligible application of the idea. But, like in IPC, the specific workings of
this “essential invention” are not disclosed; the claim merely states in broad
language that the outsource provider is to first retrieve stored data corre-
sponding to the source page, and then use the stored data to “automatically
generate” the hybrid webpage—as if by magic.138 Without more to explain
how the essence of the invention—the merging of the webpages—is
achieved, these steps are but hollow echoes of the abstract idea of automati-
cally generating composite webpages.
A narrower construction of the abstract idea would be something like
“the automatic creation of a product page that looks and feels like the source
page upon the activation of a hyperlink on the source page.” In this case, the
outsource provider—which automatically compiles and overlays the data
from the source and product pages to produce a composite page—would be
a necessary component of the abstract idea and could not be counted as an
additional, potentially inventive step. And neither could the rest of the com-
ponents. The claims’ “data store,” “computer store,” “computer processor,”
“web browser,” etc., are akin to the “data processing system,” “communica-
tions controller,” and “data storage unit” in Alice. The Alice Court dismissed
these elements as “purely functional and generic,” and nothing more than “a
handful of generic computer components configured to implement the [ab-
137. An even broader construction would be “a method to retain website visitors,” or “a
method of internet advertising,” but these suffer from the same problem as the less broad
construction discussed here. Granted, under these broadest constructions there may not even be
a need for a Step Two analysis, since the claimed method would easily be considered a spe-
cific application of these broadest constructions. A reasonable challenger would seek to invali-
date the claims under the level of abstraction at which he would get to, and succeed at Step
Two, i.e., at a moderate level of abstraction.
138. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (finding that the representative claim “recites a system that,
among other things, 1) stores ‘visually perceptible elements’ corresponding to numerous host
websites in a database, with each of the host websites displaying at least one link associated
with a product or service of a third-party merchant, 2) on activation of this link by a website
visitor, automatically identifies the host, and 3) instructs an Internet web server of an ‘out-
source provider’ to construct and serve to the visitor a new, hybrid web page that merges
content associated with the products of the third-party merchant with the stored ‘visually per-
ceptible elements’ from the identified host website”). See also U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 col
27 l. 65 – col. 28 l. 32 (filed Jan. 30, 2006).
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stract] idea.”139 Therefore, regardless of a broad or narrow construction, the
claims in DDR should have failed at Step Two.
The reason the claims survived is probably because the DDR court was
willing to construe inventiveness at a whole claims level. Even though no
individual component, such as the outsource provider, was independently
inventive, the court thought the whole idea of dressing up a third party’s
website to look like the host website was inventive. By contrast, the Ul-
tramercial court focused only on the inventiveness of the individual compo-
nents. If DDR had been subjected to the same scrutiny, the decision would
have probably come out looking like this (applying the DDR claim to Ul-
tramercial’s argument structure):
The . . . steps comprise the abstract concept of . . . [creating a com-
posite page that replicates the look and feel of the source page].
Adding routine additional steps such as . . . [storing the requisite
visual data, requiring an activation signal, identifying and retrieving
the visual data], and use of the Internet does not transform an other-
wise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Instead, the
claimed sequence of steps comprises only “conventional steps,
specified at a high level of generality,” which is insufficient to sup-
ply an “inventive concept.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo,
132 S. Ct. 1294, 1297, 1300). Indeed, the steps of . . . [storing the
requisite visual data] represent insignificant “data-gathering steps,”
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2011), and thus add nothing of practical significance to
the underlying abstract idea. Further, that the . . . [server automati-
cally identifies and retrieves the appropriate set of stored visual ele-
ments for the source webpage] also represents only insignificant
“[pre]-solution activity,” which is also not sufficient to transform an
otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject
matter.140
  Had Ultramercial’s patents been evaluated at DDR’s whole claims level,
the court would probably have concluded that Ultramercial’s method of in-
ternet advertising was neither routine nor conventional. But taking a step
back, it is not altogether clear that the court would get to Step Two to assess
routineness and conventionality, because under a proper Step One analysis,
Ultramercial’s claims should not have been held to be abstract.
139. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360. See also id. at 2358 (“[W]holly generic computer imple-
mentation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assur-
ance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.’ ”) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
140. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16.
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In Ultramercial, the appellants contended that their claims were not ab-
stract because they were “directed to a specific method of advertising and
content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed on
the Internet before.”141 The court disagreed with the appellant, instead siding
with the appellees and the district court in characterizing the claims as di-
rected to the abstract idea “that one can use [an] advertisement as an ex-
change or currency.”142 While it is true that at the highest level of abstraction
the patent teaches a method of using advertisement as currency, the court
mischaracterizes the challenged claims. They are not “so abstract and sweep-
ing as to cover both known and unknown uses” of advertisements function-
ing as currency on the internet.143
First, the claims apply only to media products that “are covered by intel-
lectual property rights protection” and which “are available for purchase.”144
The claims do not cover non-copyrighted media products (“freeware”), such
as all Twitch video streams,145 and all user-generated YouTube videos. The
claims also do not cover streaming sites where the media is unavailable for
sale on that site. For example, YouTube streams official, copyrighted music
videos of virtually every famous celebrity, but consumers are unable to
purchase these music videos from YouTube.
Second, the claims apply only to media that has general public access
restrictions.146 This means that sites like YouTube with default open door
policies are not covered.
Third, the claims apply only when a user must view the ad as a precon-
dition for access, and even then only under the user’s active request. Sites
that enable access by default, and which intersperse non-user requested ads
during the airing of the media product, are not covered. Even if the ad were
shown at the beginning, it would not be covered if it played automatically
without a user’s active request.
Finally, the claims do not cover traditional forms of web advertising
such as pop-up banner ads and embedded advertisements which do not re-
quire a user’s active consent.
Thus, unlike in Benson—which purported to claim a fundamental al-
gorithm of virtually unlimited utility in computer programming—the scope
of the Ultramercial claims is precisely known and well-delineated. In fact,
141. Id. at 714.
142. Id.
143. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 68).
144. ‘545 Patent, supra note 120, at col 8, l. 7-12.
145. See TWITCH, http://www.twitch.tv/p/about (“Founded in June 2011, Twitch is the
world’s leading social video platform and community for gamers. Each month, more than 100
million community members gather to watch and talk about video games with more than 1.7
million broadcasters. Twitch’s live and video on demand platform caters to the entire video
game industry, including game developers, publishers, media outlets, events, casual content
creators, and the entire esports scene.”).
146. ‘545 Patent, supra note 120 at col. 8, l. 22-23.
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the claims are restricted to just one particular mode of advertising—one
which requires a user’s active, rather than passive, participation to request a
viewing of the advertisement.147 These limitations should have allayed fears
that the claims would be “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known
and unknown uses [of the invention].”148 Indeed, they should have instilled
confidence that the claims were not directed to such a high level of abstrac-
tion that they would “pre-empt the [concept of using advertising as currency]
and in practical effect be a patent on the [concept] itself.”149 The facts better
support a finding that the method was not abstract, but was simply appel-
lants’ inventive way of solving the Napster problem—“a specific method of
advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and never
employed on the Internet before.”150
To sum up, the two-round comparison of Ultramercial and DDR shows
that the Federal Circuit has not consistently applied the Alice two-step. Pro-
cedurally, Step One was skipped in DDR, but not in Ultramercial. Substan-
tively, in Step Two, the Ultramercial court seemed inclined only on
searching for an inventive application at the individual component level, un-
like in DDR, where the court was focused on the whole claims level. Be-
cause the inconsistent emphasis has led to opposite results, further guidance
is necessary from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court to explain when
one approach would predominate over the other, i.e., when a finding of in-
ventive application at the whole claims level would predominate over a lack
of inventive application at the individual component level, and vice versa. If
any amount of inventive application at the whole claims level will do, then
courts should seriously analyze whole claims with the same rigor as they do
individual steps (for now, whole claims analysis seems more a conclusory
afterthought than an actual consideration).151
147. Id. at col. 8, l. 27-30, 38-42. In the sixth step of the claimed method, the consumer
must request to view the sponsor message. In the ninth step of the claimed method pertaining
to interactive ads, the copyrighted media will only be unlocked after receiving a response to
the interactive query.
148. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
149. Id.
150. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714.
151. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (“Those steps, when viewed as a whole, add
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately”); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351
(“Viewed as a whole, these method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settle-
ment as performed by a generic computer. They do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or techni-
cal field.”); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (“[The] ordered combination of steps recites an
abstraction—an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form. The process of receiving
copyrighted media, selecting an ad, offering the media in exchange for watching the selected
ad, displaying the ad, allowing the consumer access to the media, and receiving payment from
the sponsor of the ad all describe an abstract idea, devoid of a concrete or tangible application.
Although certain additional limitations, such as consulting an activity log, add a degree of
particularity, the concept embodied by the majority of the limitations describes only the ab-
stract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content.”).
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V. UNEXPECTED RESULTS AS AN ESCAPE HATCH AND THE 4-BOX MATRIX
  One proposal to reconcile the outcomes in DDR and Ultramercial is to
hold that an inventive concept may be supplied by an “ordered combination
of steps”152 which produces an unconventional or unexpected result. This
notion derives from the DDR opinion itself, where one of the ways the court
distinguished DDR from Ultramercial was that “the claims at issue here [in
DDR] specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a
desired result—a result . . . [which causes] the computer network [not to]
operat[e] in its normal, expected manner.”153 This results-based analysis
seems consistent with Diehr, which also distinguished Flook on the basis
that the claims resulted in the creation of something new and unexpected—
as the Diehr Court stated, the perfectly cured synthetic rubber product was
“a result heretofore unknown in the art.”154 However, I do not suggest that
unconventional or unexpected results are required to pass Step Two; but if
such results can be found in the claims at issue, there is a good chance that
the claims can be saved.
If a finding of unexpected results is a valid basis on which to distinguish
DDR from Ultramercial, then Step Two can be visualized as a four-box
matrix. On the horizontal axis is the conventionality of the individual steps.
On the vertical axis is the conventionality of the ordered combination/result,
or the expectedness of the effects. The four possible combinations are illus-
trated as shown:
152. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (“[W]e consider the elements of each claim both indi-
vidually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘trans-
form the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”).
153. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258. See also id. at 1258-59 (“Unlike the claims in Ultramercial,
the claims at issue here specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a
desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordina-
rily triggered by the click of a hyperlink. Instead of the computer network operating in its
normal, expected manner by sending the website visitor to the third-party website that appears
to be connected with the clicked advertisement, the claimed system generates and directs the
visitor to the above-described hybrid web page that presents product information from the
third-party and visual ‘look and feel’ elements from the host website.”).
154. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at n.15 (The “claims . . . are not limited to the isolated step of
‘programming a digital computer.’ Rather, [the] claims describe a process of curing rubber
beginning with the loading of the mold and ending with the opening of the press and the
production of a synthetic rubber product that has been perfectly cured—a result heretofore
unknown in the art.”) (emphasis added).
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The four-box matrix serves as a reminder that even though over nine out
of ten software patents have been invalidated at the Federal Circuit—and all
rejects have so far landed in the same quadrant of the matrix—there exist
three other quadrants, each of which represents a patent-eligible combina-
tion. Additionally, this four-box matrix can help patent practitioners and
analysts quickly visualize the strength of their patent portfolios.
Patents in the top-right “conventional steps, unexpected effects” quad-
rant are unpredictable and exciting. Given the courts’ current propensity to
emphasize individual step analysis over ordered combination analysis, a
showing of unexpected effects can make all the difference for cases other-
wise indistinguishable on the facts. Emphasis should be placed on showing
how the invention at the whole claims level is a specific implementation of
an improvement over the prior art—i.e., instead of referencing the individual
steps, reference the effects instead. For example, Diehr’s algorithm led to
perfectly cured synthetic rubber, a result “unknown” to the art at the time,
and DDR’s mimetic hybrid webpage helped visitors to not feel “transported
away” from the host webpage when they clicked on an advertiser’s link.
By contrast, patents in the top-left “unconventional steps, unexpected
effects” quadrant seem like a slam dunk, since both individual steps and
combination effects are unconventional or unexpected. Although none of the
discussed cases fit in this category, it is still useful to think of the category as
an aspirational target.
Patents in the bottom-left “unconventional steps, expected effects”
quadrant are what I would call the classic, “run-of-the-mill” patents—they
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disclose new ways of doing old things. As one author puts it, “Class 43
[Fishing, Trapping and Vermin Destroying] is a testament to man’s continu-
ing war with the mouse, including subcategories for ‘impaling,’ ‘explosive,’
‘choking or squeezing’ and ‘electrocuting’ traps, in addition to those that
‘smite.’”155 The abstract ideas of “impaling,” “detonating” or “smiting” mice
is made patent-eligible by the multitude of unconventional steps man has
conjured, in all his boundless imagination, to effectuate the extermination of
the much-maligned creature. An unconventional electrocution step to stun a
mouse before its regular demise by smiting may just be the winning ticket.
Finally, the darling of the courts these days, and where patents go to
rest, is the “conventional steps, expected effects” quadrant. Examples of
steps and additional features which courts have held insufficient to transform
an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter include the following: ge-
neric computer implementation;156 the Internet;157 combining intangible
data;158 unblocking access to media;159 applying well-known technologies
such as digitizers to hardcopy information;160 and using a computer to opti-
mize price.161
CONCLUSION
  It may seem incredible that over a century-and-a-half after Le Roy, courts
are still unable to concisely define what constitutes an abstract idea. This is
not altogether surprising, considering the fact that since Le Roy, abstract
ideas have been defined by what they are not—i.e., applied ones. From prac-
tical application to process application to inventive application, the line be-
tween patent-ineligible ideas (the so-called abstract ideas) and patent-
eligible applications of those ideas has been a moving target. Rather than
clarifying the doctrine, it seems the Court has only made things worse. In
leaping to the inventive application standard in Mayo, the Court obfuscated
glaring incompatibilities and philosophical differences that underlay some of
its own precedent, and buried Diehr’s challenge to the relevance of novelty
in the subject matter eligibility inquiry.
Practically, the Court’s reticence in positively delimiting the abstract
idea category has led to significant inconsistencies in the way its patent eli-
gibility framework has been applied at the Federal Circuit. Before Mayo and
Alice, a negative definition of an abstract idea worked well, because there
was not a Step One which required courts to determine, prior to and inde-
pendent of Step Two’s inventive application test, whether claims were di-
155. Alan L. Durham, Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide 19 (4th ed. 2013).
156. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
157. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716.
158. Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
159. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16.
160. CET, 776 F.3d at 1347.
161. OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363.
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rected to an abstract idea. Post-Alice, precisely delineating the abstract idea
is necessary, since it determines the “additional steps” that will be analyzed
under Step Two. These days, it seems taken for granted that there is always
an abstract idea to be found in the claims, even when the claims appear to
reflect carefully considered decisions designed to achieve a specified aim in
a particular manner. If, as a policy matter, the abstract idea doctrine was
really only about precluding broad monopolies over fundamental concepts or
over the basic tools of technology, perhaps the incredible invalidation statis-
tics at the courts and the PTAB should give judges pause to consider how
they have been applying Alice.
At the end of the day, the line between patent-eligible and ineligible
ideas is a fine line that is only going to get finer, for as long as humanity
progresses and continues developing new technologies, so too will the num-
ber of “fundamental truths” and “blocks of human ingenuity” continue to
increase. We owe it to ourselves, and to the next generation of inventors, to
be more conscientious of what we invalidate, and why.
